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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. Issue:
The degree of corroboration required for a witness’ testimony to be regarded as
credible by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(Hereinafter “ICTR”). The factors that affect the determination of credibility depend on
the standard of corroboration applied by the Trial Chamber. Currently the ICTR is at a
crossroads in its decision of whether to apply a strict and “high standard of proof for the
prosecution,”1 or a more conventional standard.2
Moreover, the development of South African Law has taken into account the
standards set in English and Scottish Law. It continually strives to set reasonable and fair
standards in the assessment of witness’ testimonies, evidence, and other factors, which
are considered when determining the standard of corroboration.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1) The ICTR must establish a standard of corroboration, which is concurrent with
common sense.
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber noted that the fallibility inaccuracies and
contradictions in testimonies are a natural occurrence when dealing with human memory
and sight, human characteristics which may allow a witness to easily interpret events

1

See email from ICTR Prosecutor, Charles Adeogun, dated September 12, 2001, page 1
[hereinafter ICTR Proscutor’s email.] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 1.]
2

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

1

differently as time lapses.3 It would otherwise be unjust to deem that failure to accurately
recall an event from memory to be the equivalent of providing false testimony. As the
court pointed out in Akayesu, the essential factor to prove that the witness has provided
the court with false testimony, is assessment of the mens rea element.4 The Trial
Chamber in Akayesu, is right on point with the standards of corroboration which it
established.
Furthermore, in Bagilishema, the Trial Chamber’s rigid standard requiring
testimonies to be coinciding in details has mistakenly established that the weight of
evidence should be determined by the consistency of statements submitted into evidence.
In fact, in South Africa, it has been established that the weight of testimonial evidence
must be determined in light of its merits and demerits to determine whether the truth has
been flushed out despite any inaccuracies.5
Presently, the ICTR seems in conflict between the degree of corroboration
required for a witness’s testimony to be credible. However, the rationale exercised in
Akayesu is the prevalent standard used by courts around the world. More specifically, the
legal systems in South Africa, England and Scotland agree that the determination of
whether a standard of corroboration has been met, depends on a number of factors, the
3

Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998), par. 140.
http://www.itcr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay.001.htm [hereinafter
Akayesu Judgment]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
4

Akayesu Judgment, paragraph 140 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
2].
5

S .v Sauls and Others, 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 180E-G. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 3.] See also 1 MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND VIRGINIA
MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 572 (1998).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4.]

2

context in which the evidence is submitted, and the degree to which the standard will be
met.

2)

Standards and procedures the ICTR should apply in its determination as to
whether the standard of corroboration has been met.

The key element in determining what evidence may be admissible in an attempt to
corroborate a witness’s testimony lies in the Trial Chamber’s acknowledgment that no
one rule or doctrine of law can account for every factual situation that may arise in a
case.6 Such foresight may be adopted by recognizing a “common sense” standard which
other courts apply in their assessment of what degree of weight should be assigned to
evidence submitted before the court.7 More importantly, in order to determine whether
the standard of corroboration has been met, the court needs to address the following:
(a) whether the evidence is admissible, (b) to what degree does supporting evidence if
any need to be presented to the court to determine the witness’ credibility, and (c)
whether the evidence submitted confirms by some material particulars that the offence
charged was committed by the accused.8 The standard of corroboration which the Trial
Chamber establishes, must enhance the Trial Chamber’s ability to combine its discretion
and common sense when determining whether the evidence is relevant, truthful and
contains some weight.
6

See Banana v. State, (2000) 8 BHRC 345 (Zim). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5.]
7

See R v. P, (1991) 3 All E.R. 337 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 6.]
8

See ICTR Prosecutor’s email. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1.]

3

a) Evidence must be admissible in itself.
The scale on which probative value of evidence will be weighed will depend on
the discretion of the court.9 Consequently, there is no one method of assigning probative
value to evidence since the circumstances under which such evidence may develop can
vary. Accordingly, the assessment of evidence must be established on a case by case
basis.10 Otherwise, such extreme restrictions would establish an unjustified principle of
excluding evidence-having prejudice towards the accused although its probative value
can defeat the taint of prejudice.
Following the examples of South African and English Law, the Trial Chamber
should be able to recognize that the very fact that similar fact evidence is held to be
admissible should reiterate the fact that its probative value was the reason for its
admissibility.11 Moreover, judges should not be so quick to dismiss testimony that is not
the exact mirror image of the previously stated facts in a witness’s prior statement, or in
comparison to another witness’s testimony. The discretion, with which the Trial Chamber
has been empowered,12 should provide it with the necessary tools to adduce the weight of
9

DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES, at 384
(4th ed.) vol. 2, (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute, 1844). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 7.]
10

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]

11

See DPP v. Kilbourne, (1993) 1 All E.R. 440 (Eng.). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8.] See also R v. H, (1995) All E.R. 865. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
12

See 1 MICHAEL P. SCHARF & VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA at 572 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 4.]

4

similar fact evidence. The admissibility of similar fact evidence does not turn on the
repetitive consistency of the testimony, but on whether it contains any probative value.13

b) The trier of fact although not required by law, should always seek corroboration to
support the evidence, which is being submitted in support of allegations made at trial.

Although not required by law, the trier of fact should always seek corroboration to
support the evidence, which is being submitted in support of allegations made at trial.
The South African rule against self-corroboration seems to be in agreement with the
additional requirements that should be placed on single-witness evidence. The courts of
South Africa have balanced the safe guards against assessing single-witness testimony by
allowing support for witnesses testimony to be accomplished by taking into account other
facts and circumstances. Although South African Law does not require corroboration of
a single-witness’ testimony,14 it encourages the trier of facts to seek out corroboration in
order to maintain a delicate balance between caution and a fair trial for both the
complainants and the accused. However, it is for the trier of facts to also use her
discretion as to what degree of corroboration if any is required depending on the
underlying circumstance and facts of a case.

13

See DPP v Kilbourne, (1993) 1 All E.R. 440 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 8.]

14

PJ SCHWIKKARD, A ST Q. SKEEN, & S.E. VAN DER MERWE, ET A.L., PRINCIPLES OF
EVIDENCE, at 372 (Juta & Co. Ltd. 1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 10.]

5

c)

There are three factors that the Trial Chamber needs to address when trying to
determine whether the evidence submitted confirms by some material particulars that
the offence charged was committed by the accused. The three factors are: (a) the
Trial must establish the standard of caution; (b) cautionary standards must be
established in light of the standards set forth by single-witness evidence; and (c) the
Trial Chamber must look at the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The Trial Chamber in determining whether the evidence confirms by some material
particulars that the offence charged was committed by the accused, should first establish
a standard of caution and then look at the totality of the circumstantial evidence.
However, what should be deduced from the evolution of South African Law dealing with
cases of sexual assault, is that caution should not “displace the exercise of common
sense.”15 Moreover, while corroboration is not a prerequisite to accepting the evidence of
a single witness, the caution of the Trial Chamber may be satisfied by any factors
establishing that the witness’ story was not concocted and which concurrently add weight
to the credibility of the witness. 16 The basic nature of the single-witness “rule” should
not be applied as a rule of law, but as a rule of common sense when assessing the
credibility of a single-witness in light of precautionary issues.17
15

S v. Artman, 1968 (3) SA 339 (A) at 341B. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11.]
S v. Chouhan, 1987 (2) SA 315 (ZS) at 316J-318A. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 12.]
R v J, 1966 (1) SA 88 at page 90. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
13.]
See also S v. Snymam, 1968 (2) SA 582 (A) at 585G. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 14.]
16

See Banana .v State. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

17

W.A. JOUBERT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE, at 575 (Butterworths Durban
1996 vol. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 15.]

6

Furthermore, inflexible and extremely restrictive standards should not be applied
as the standard rule of thumb in ensuing cases. The Trial Chamber needs to look at the
totality of the circumstantial evidence before coming to a determination of whether the
evidence establishes that the witness is stating the truth. If the witness is held to be
telling the truth or some truths, determining the weight of the truthful statements should
help the court in its decision as to whether to convict. Mere inaccuracies however,
should not be an excuse to so easily dismiss evidence, which may have some, the least
probative value.
Whether the Trial Chamber decides to apply a strict or a less restrictive standard
of admissibility of testimonies, will have a profound effect on the outcome of future
trials. Ultimately, the question is still whether the requisite of standard of proof (in
criminal cases proof beyond a reasonable doubt) has been satisfied.18

18

See S v. Artman, 1968 (3) SA 339, at 341 (B). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11.] See also S v. D, 1992 (1) SA 513 (Namibia). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]

7

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema
In The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, the Trial Chamber’s assessment of
factual “irregularities” established a standard of corroboration requiring the evidence
presented to be “coinciding in detail” and “mutually corroborative.”19 The chamber held
that “the testimonies of witnesses AB and O, although similar in broad outline, do not
coincide in detail.”20 The Chamber therefore held that “the credibility of the two
witnesses had been questioned.”21 Consequently, the Trial Chamber dismissed the
testimonial evidence for lack of corroboration.
B. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu
In The Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that
“for a number of these witnesses, there appeared to be contradictions or inaccuracies
between, on the one hand, the content of their testimonies under solemn declaration to the
Chamber, and on the other, their earlier statements made to the Prosecutor and the
Defence.” The Chamber further noted that “this alone is not a ground for believing that
the witnesses gave false testimony. Indeed, an often levied criticism of testimony is its
fallibility. Since testimony is based mainly on memory and sight, two human

19

Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T (June 7, 2001),.
http://www.ictr.org/English/cases/Bagilishema/judgment/5d.htm, (visited November 28,
2001) [hereinafter Bagilishema Judgment]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 17.]
20

id., see par. 750. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

21

id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

8

characteristics which often deceive the individual, this criticism is to be expected.”22
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber determined the testimonial evidence carried sufficient
weight and deemed it admissible.
C. Definitions
Corroboration “is evidence which confirms or supports a fact of which other evidence
is given.23 Corroboration is also defined as “evidence which renders the factum
probandum more probable by strengthening the proof of one or more facta probantia.”24
“Evidence, which is merely consistent with facts, which are not in dispute, cannot be
described as corroboration: corroborative evidence must have a bearing on facts, which
are in dispute.”25 Black’s Dictionary’s definition of corroboration states:
Confirmation or support by additional evidence or authority <corroboration of the
Witness’s testimony>.26

In essence, the corroboration of a witness’s testimony may be established, where the
following elements are present:
a) The evidence must be admissible in itself;
22

Akayesu Judgment, par. 140. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

23

S v. B, 1976 2 SA 54 (C) 59. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]
See also PJ SCHWIKKARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, at 57 (Butterworths Durban
1996 vol. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

24

Popovic v. Derks, 1961 V.R. 413. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
19.] See also PJ SCHWIKKARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, at 57 (Butterworths
Durban 1996 vol. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
25

R v. P, 1957 3 SA 444 (A) 454. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
See PJ SCHWIKKARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, at 57 (Butterworths Durban
1996 vol. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
26

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 348 (7th ed. 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 20.]

9

b) The evidence must originate from a source, which is independent of the evidence
required to be corroborated; and
c) The evidence must tend to show by confirmation of some material particulars that
the offense charged was committed and was committed by the accused or his
subordinates. 27:
While the ICTR is not bound by rules of national evidence,28 having such a vast scope
of discretion and little structure to work from, impedes the Trial Chamber’s ability to set
reasonable standards for corroboration. Particularly critical is the ICTR’s assessment of
witness testimony, which plays a greater role than once held before the Nuremberg
Tribunal that dealt with a meticulous “paper trail” as evidence.29 Case in point, Durward
V. Sandifer captured the essence of an international tribunal’s shortcoming when he
stated that the scope of discretion which international tribunals are afforded could
actually become a handicap by stating that:
It has been persuasively argued that the very fact of liberality in the
admission of evidence “makes it all the more incumbent upon the parties to
observe and upon the Tribunal to apply those laws of logic, those principles of
general jurisprudence, and those of general assumptions regarding the conduct of
men which are common to every system of law.”30

27

See Prosecutor’s email. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20.]

28

See 1 MICHAEL P. SCHARF & VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 564 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
21.]
29

See id. at 571. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

30

DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, at 20.
(University Press of Virginia Charlottesville, Revised ed. 1975). (quoting The Norwegian
Claims Case (United States v. Norway), 1921, COUNTER CASE OF THE UNITED STATES 4
1922 (discussing the power of a tribunal which although each has its own rules of
procedure, should focus more of substantive law rather than relying on its rules of
procedure, particularly in when evaluating evidence). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 22.]

10

In other words, the tribunal may allow the admissibility of any relevant evidence, which
it deems to have probative value.31 However, such vast power of discretion is available as
long as the Tribunal stays within the requisite of a fair trial.32 Consequently, the Trial
Chamber’s conservative interpretation of a fair trial is inhibiting the ICTR from
benefiting from its vast power of discretion.

31

Akayesu Judgment, par. 133, 136. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
2.]
32

See Rules of Evidence and Procedure of Rwanda, Rule 89, reproduced in 1 MICHAEL
P. SCHARF & VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
564, 565 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

11

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Evidence must be admissible in itself.
1) South African courts have set standards for the admissibility of similar fact
evidence by relying on English Law of Similar Fact Evidence.
First, the greatest challenge the courts face is determining the admissibility of similar
fact evidence which is inherently prejudicial towards the accused. Similar fact evidence
is defined as “evidence, which establishes that an accused committed other crimes, and if
true, so probative of the crime of which he is accused that fairness and common sense
demand that it is admitted.”33 Furthermore, the probative value of similar fact evidence
derives from the combination of various testimonies that together provide some degree of
corroboration for each other, but which would otherwise be dismissed for lack of
probative value if made independently.34 Moreover, the determining factors of the
admissibility of similar fact evidence depends on whether: 1) the probative value of the
evidence outweighs the prejudicial effects, and 2) whether there is a risk of contamination

33

Lord Griffiths establishing the meaning of similar fact evidence as per R v. P, (1991)
All E.R. 337 (Eng)., in his opinion in R v. H, (1995) All E.R. 865, at 13 (Eng).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
34

R v Sims, was an appeal from a conviction varying on a number of charges from rape,
attempted rape, buggery, and assault. The complainants were four prostitutes, half of
which were from one town and the other half from another, and a fifth prostitute which
submitted evidence of rape on the basis of “similar fact evidence. The Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division), allowed the appeal on two counts based on it’s observation that the
judge had failed to direct the jury the issue of lack of corroboration, and then dismissed
other counts. See R v Sims (1946) K.B. 531 at p 540. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 23.]

12

by collusion.35 The standard of admissibility set by the court is crucial because of its
effects on the case at hand and the precedent set for future trials.
In South Africa, courts relying on English law found that similar facts must have
a “striking similarity” in order to have significant probative value and therefore be
admissible.36 This strict standard was established in Boardman v DPP, an appeal from a
conviction which was based on the testimony of two pupils, 16 and 17 years of age,
charging their headmaster with (homosexual) sexual misconduct and incitement to
commit sexual misconduct.37 The court held that because of the “striking similarity” of
the crimes described in the two witnesses’ testimonies, the testimonies would be
admissible as similar fact evidence.38 The evidence which corroborates that the accused
committed the very acts he was charged with will be admissible, regardless of the fact
that the evidence would also corroborate that other criminal conduct not at trial were also

35

See R v. P. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.] See also R v H.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

36

Boardman v. DPP (1974) All E.R. 887 at 879, (Eng). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 24.] See also S v. Ngara, 1987 (1) Z.L.R. 91 at 100.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 25.] S v. Mupah, 1989 (1) Z.L.R. 279
at 284. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26.] S v. Mutsinzinri, 1997
(1) Z.L.R. 6 at 23. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 27.]
37

Boardman v. DPP, (1974) All E.R. 887 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 24.]
38

See Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

13

committed.39 Although this may have seemed as giving the court broader discretion
when dealing with similar fact evidence, it was actually more restrictive.
In essence, the requirement that similar fact evidence be of “striking similarity”
set a high and inflexible standard. The court erroneously limited the scope of
circumstances under which similar fact evidence could be admissible by focusing on the
similarity of the criminal conduct, rather than emphasizing the significance of an
allegation of another crime which provided probative value in support of the claimant’s
assertions before the court.40 If the court tailors the admissibility of similar fact evidence
so narrowly, it would be overlooking the fact that crimes could be less than strikingly
similar, yet provide some if not significant amount of probative value to the allegations
being made.41 On the other hand, similar fact evidence could meet the requirement of
striking similarity yet provide no probative value.42
In contrast, in recent English cases, the courts have established that such high
standards of “striking similarities” are simply too restrictive.43 Contrary to Boardman, in
R v P, such a high standard of scrutiny of similar fact evidence although accepted as a
“basic principle,”44 was discredited as a prerequisite to admissibility.”45 In essence, the
39

See R v. H. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

40

See Banana v. State, (where the court explained its rationale for disagreeing with the
court’s decision in Boardman v. DPP). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 5.]
41

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

42

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

43

See R v P. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

44

S v. D, 1991 (2) SACR 543 at 546. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 28.]
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test of admissibility should not focus solely on the similarity of the conduct, but rather on
whether there is sufficient relation between the evidence of one victim to provide support
for the other victim and whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
prejudicial effects.46 Consequently, the very fact that similar fact evidence is held to be
admissible should reiterate the fact that its probative value was the reason for its
admissibility. Otherwise, in an attempt to appease the restrictive standards of “striking
similarity,” the court could easily dismiss evidence containing sufficient weight.
However, similar to the court’s holding in Boardman,47the Trial Chamber in
Bagilishema48, set a high standard of corroboration. In Bagilishema, the Trial Chamber
disregarded witnesses’ testimonies by holding that the testimonies given by the witnesses
did not as the court said, coincide in detail and were not found to be mutually
corroborative. 49 Nevertheless, the fact that the testimonies were admissible in the first
place, suggests that the court did not apply the high standard of “striking similarities”
S v. M, 1995 (1) SACR 667 at 692). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
29.]
45

In R v. P, the defendant was charged with the rape and incest of his two daughters over
along period of time. Although there was one of the issues was the risk of contamination
by collusion, since both girls lived under the same roof, the court held the there was
sufficient relation of the evidence of one victim to provide support for the second victim.
The court recognized that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial
effects of its admissibility. See R v. P [1991] 3 All E.R. 337 (Eng). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

46

See id. at 346. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

47

See DPP v. Boardman. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

48

Bagilishema Judgment. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

49

Bagilishema Judgment, paragraph 716. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 17.]
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when determining whether the testimonies would be admissible as similar fact evidence.
Consequently, the similar fact evidence was admissible because the Trial Chamber
believed that despite prejudicial effects, the probative value of the testimonies
outweighed the prejudice.50 If the testimonies were deemed to have significant probative
value, then the Trial Chamber erred in applying such a high standard of corroboration and
dismissing the testimonies in light of a few inaccuracies.
It should be noted that the scale on which probative value of evidence will be
weighed will be depend on the discretion of the court.51 Consequently, there is no one
method of assigning probative value to evidence since the circumstances under which
such evidence may develop can vary greatly. Accordingly, the assessment of evidence
must be established on a case by case basis.52 Otherwise, such extreme restrictions would
establish an unjustified principle by excluding evidence-having prejudice towards the
accused notwithstanding that its probative value could defeat the taint of prejudice.53
An international tribunal’s broad range of discretion54 may sometimes undermine
the ultimate purpose of that freedom. While the Trial Chamber is concerned about an
50

In R v. H, Judgement 1 by Lord Macky’s commented that if a court decides that similar
fact evidence is inadmissible, then its because the evidence bares no probative value. See
R v. H. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]
51

DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES,
RESPECTING CRIMES at 384 (4th ed.) vol. 2, (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute, 1844).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]
52

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.]

53

See R v. P. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

54

See also 1 MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 564 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
21.]
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unfair trial by holding an innocent person guilty of a crime they did not commit,55 it
would also be as unfair to exclude similar fact evidence of such great probative value
simply because of its propensity for prejudice. In the end, “the concept of admissibility
turns on probative weight which, like the question of corroboration, is a matter of logic
and common sense, and not of legal doctrine.”56

2) Similar Fact Evidence is admissible regardless if there is a general risk of
contamination by collusion.
Another issue that arises when dealing with similar fact evidence is the risk of
contamination by collusion.57 Contamination by collusion occurs when witnesses make a
conscious effort to concoct a story, or may also occur when a witness is influenced by
another witness, but on an unconscious level.58 Most importantly, the court needs to

55

ROBERT S. CLARK & MADELEINE SANN, THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CIRMES
at 326 (Transaction Publishers1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
30.]
56

See Banana v. State (2000) 8 B.H.R.C. 345 (Zim). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 5.]

57

Collusion by definition is “an agreement to defraud or to obtain something forbidden
by law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (7th ed. 1999). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 31.]
58

In R v. H the defendant appealed from convictions based on charges of sexual offenses
made towards his adopted daughter and stepdaughter over a period of three years. The
issue of collusion arose because both first complained to them the defendant’s wife, both
girls had also had the opportunity to discuss the matter between the two of them. The
defendant appeal was based on his claim that there had existed a risk of collusion. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal holding that if there had been a real possibility of
collusion, the judge would have held the similar fact evidence to be inadmissible,
otherwise the risk of collusion would only affect the probative weight of the evidence. In
addition, the Court reaffirmed that the judge was correct in allowing the determination of
credibility and whether the evidence could be used as corroboration, up for the jury to
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determine whether the risk of contamination by collusion should affect the admissibility
of similar fact evidence.
First, in R v H, the court held that the admissibility of evidence should be decided
regardless of whether there was an issue of contamination by collusion.59 The decision to
admit similar fact evidence establishes that there is a significant relationship between the
crimes.60 Furthermore, when similar fact evidence is deemed admissible all that has been
established is that the evidence has sufficient probative value, but no determination has
been made by the court that it is accepted to be true.61 Whether a witness’s testimony is
credible is for the jury to decide62 after the jury has had an opportunity to hear each
testimony and assess the demeanor of each witness.
However, if there is a real risk of collusion then it is up to the judge to hold that
the similar fact evidence is inadmissible. 63 If the evidence has been contaminated by
collusion, then the judge must further hold that there can be no mutual corroboration
between the similar fact evidence.64 Similarly the Trial Chamber, must also acknowledge

decide. See R v. H, (1995) 2 All E.R. 865(Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 9.]
59

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

60

See R v. P. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

61

See R v. H. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

62

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

63

R v. Ananthanaryanan, (1997) 2 All E.R. 847 (Eng). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 33.]See also R v H. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 31.]
See also DPP v. Kilbourne, (1993) 1 All E.R. 440 (Eng). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
64

See R v. Ananthanaryanan. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
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that the possibility of unconscious collusion, may also be determinative as to whether the
evidence can be held mutually corroborating.65 Although there will always be a general
risk of collusion in similar fact evidence, a general risk should not affect the admissibility
of similar fact evidence when determining whether the evidence is reliable.66
Moreover, in DPP v Kilbourne, the court held that it was “immaterial” whether
similar fact evidence was mutually corroborative, what was more important was whether
the evidence of the second group of witnesses was admissible to support the charges
made by the first group of witnesses accusing the defendant of committing the crimes
with which he was accused.67 However, more importantly was the court’s holding that
the evidence of the second group of witnesses could be held as corroboration of the first
group’s claims if the evidence was deemed credible.68 Accordingly, although it will be
common for there to be a risk of collusion, once similar fact evidence has been held to be
admissible, it should then be used to assert the truth and if credible, to serve as
corroboration. 69
Following the examples of South African and English Law, the Trial Chambers
should be able to recognize that the fact that similar fact evidence was held admissible in

65

R v. Ryder at 879, 880. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

66

See R v. Ryder. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 32.]

67

DPP v Kilbourne, dealt with an appeal by the prosecution, where the accused was
charged with sexual offences (homosexual conduct), against two different groups of
boys. The incidents took place about a year apart. DPP v Kilbourne, (1993) 1 All E.R.
440 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
68

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

69

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
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the first place, signifies that the evidence has probative value.70 Moreover, the Trial
Chambers should not be so quick to dismiss testimony that is not the exact mirror image
of the previously stated facts in a witness’s prior statement testimony, or in comparison to
another witness’s testimony. The discretion, with which the tribunal has been
empowered,71 should provide it with the necessary tools to adduce the weight of similar
fact evidence. The admissibility of similar fact evidence does not turn on the repetitive
consistency of the testimonies, but on whether it contains any probative value.72

B. The trier of fact, although not required by South African Law, should always
seek corroboration to support the evidence, which is being submitted in support
of allegations made at trial.
The trier of fact, although not required by South African Law, should always seek
corroboration to support the evidence, which is being submitted in support of allegations
made at trial.73 The general rule against self-corroboration in South African Law
establishes a safeguard by requiring that an independent source of corroboration should
be applied with the exception of two situations. Exceptions to the rule against selfcorroboration arise when: (1) the injuries suffered after a violent offence may of

70

Supra note 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2.]

71

Supra note 28. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

72

See DPP v Kilbourne. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

73

PJ SCHWIKKARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE at 57 (Butterworths Durban 1996
vol. 9). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
See R v. P, comparing Scottish law’s requirement of corroboration in criminal cases and
English, law which does not. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]
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themselves reflect corroboration;74 and (2) when others observe the emotional distress
suffered by a victim soon after the incident occurred. 75
However, the application of this general rule and its exceptions should always be
tailored to fit the facts of the situation.76 Moreover, it is important that the two exceptions
to the self-corroboration rule be established with careful observation of the context in
which they are applied. For example a court should question and affirm whether the
injuries where self-inflicted or whether the distress was caused because of the incident
the offence in dispute and that there is no other explanations for the complainant’s
exhibited behavior of distress or injury.77
The essence of the rule against self-corroboration was promulgated in Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Kilbourne, as:
There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the
ordinary affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular
74

See R v. Trigg, (1963) 1 All E.R. 490 (Eng.). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 34.]

75

See R v. Redpath, 1962 46 C.R. App. R 319 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 35.] See Yates v. HM Advocate, 1997 S.L.T. (Notes) 42 (Scot.). Scottish
landmark case establishing that a victim’s distress can be a form of corroboration if
followed soon after a sexual offense. Yates, was also distinguished because in addition to
the victim’s distress, the identity of the accused was established by the accussed’s own
admission to particpating in sexual conduct with the victim. The court held that although
the victim’s distress can be corroborated by the testimony of others who observed the
distress, the identity of the accused could not be corroborated by the victim’s distress
alone. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36.]
R v. Knight, 1966 1 W.L.R. 230 (Eng). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 37.]
76

The trier of fact needs to determine whether the witness is telling the truth about how
the injuries were incurred, that they were not self-inflicted and the distress is a result of
the offense rather from some other source. PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, page 373.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
77

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]
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statement one naturally looks to see whether it fits in with other statements or
circumstances relating to the particular matter; the better it fits the in, the more
one is inclined to believe it. The doubted statement is corroborated to a greater or
lesser extent by the other statements or circumstance with which it fits in. We
must be astute to see that the apparently corroborative statement is truly
independent of the doubted statement. If there is any real chance that there has
been collusion between the makers of the two statements we should not accept
them as corroborative. And the law says that a witness cannot corroborate
himself. In ordinary affairs we are often influenced by the fact that the maker of
the doubted statement has consistently said the same thing ever since the event
described happened. But the justification for the legal view, must I think, be that
generally it would be too dangerous to take this into account and therefore it is
best to have a universal rule. 78
The evidence of corroboration need not be direct from another eyewitness, but
may also be indirect depending on the facts and circumstances.
In other words, apart from the two exceptions against self-corroboration stated in
South African Law, corroboration could also be obtained from circumstantial evidence
which may arise in a myriad of situations. Circumstantial evidence may arise from
testimony, a set of events or circumstances from which a statement in question can be
corroborated to be true or unreliable.79 Since the situations in which circumstantial
evidence may arise are endless, it is better to analyze each situation on a case by case
basis.
Furthermore, for a better understanding of the rule against self-corroboration,
South African Law has turned to Scottish Law. Scottish Law requires that there be two
witnesses; nam testis unus supicionem, non fidem facit.80 This law derived from the
78

See DPP v. Kilbourne (emphasis added). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 8.]

79

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

80

JOHN BURNETT, A TREATISE ON THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
SCOTLAND CHAPTER XIX at 509(Edinburg, Printed by G. Ramasay for A. Constable,
1811). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38.]
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Jewish and Roman laws from which Scotland continues to enforce the belief that a
conviction cannot result from the testimony of a single-witness alone.81 However,
Scottish law also evolved to recognize that this standard of legal proof could also be met
if the evidence of a single-witness could be supported indirectly by circumstantial
evidence.82
In addition, Scottish law went as far as establishing the Moroov Doctrine, which
permits the admissibility of supporting evidence even when it derives from separate
charges other than the ones at trial and from different complainants.83 The theory of the
Moroov Doctrine, is that a series of offences occurring under similar circumstances may
be so interconnected as to be part of a “course of criminal conduct.”84 In addition, if the

81

The Lord Justice General (Rodger) observing the development of Scottish Law
specifically on the requirement that more than just a single-witness’ testimony for a
conviction. See also Fox v. HM Advocate 1998 S.L.T. 335 at 339 (Scot). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 39.]

82

DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES,
RESPECTING CRIMES at 384 (4th ed.) vol. 2, (Edinburgh, Bell & Bradfute, 1844).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7.] See Moorov v. HM Advoctate,
1930 J.C. 68. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 40.]See Fox v. HM
Advocate 1998 S.L.T. 335 at 339. (Scot). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 39.] Smith v Lee 1997 S.L.T. 690 at p. 696 (Scot). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 41.] JOHN BURNETT, A TREATISE ON THE VARIOUS
BRANCHES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND CHAPTER XX (Edinburg, Printed by G.
Ramasay for A. Constable, 1811). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
42.] Alison, Sir Archibald, Practice of Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, W.
Blackwood, 1833). ). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43.]
83

See Boncza-Tomaszewski v. HM, Advocate 2000 SCCR 657. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 44.]

84

See DPP v Kilbourne. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]
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offences are deemed part of the same criminal conduct, then the evidence has met the
standard of corroboration.85
Consequently, the South African rule against self-corroboration seems to be in
agreement with the additional requirements that should be placed on single-witness
evidence. The courts of South Africa have balanced the safeguards against assessing
single-witness testimony by allowing support for witnesses testimony to be accomplished
by taking into account other facts and circumstances. Although South African Law does
not require corroboration of a single-witness’ testimony,86 it encourages the trier of facts
to seek out corroboration in the effort to maintain the delicate balance of justice and a fair
trial for both the complainants and the accused. However, it is for the trier of facts to also
use her discretion as to what degree of corroboration if any is required depending on the
underlying circumstance and facts of a case.

85

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

86

PJ SCHWIKKARD, A ST Q. SKEEN, & S.E. VAN DER MERWE, ET A.L., PRINCIPLES OF
EVIDENCE, at 372 (Juta & Co. Ltd. 1997). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 10.]
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C. Evidence submitted at trial must be assessed to determine whether it is sufficient
to establish that the accused committed the offence with which she is charged.
There are three factors that the Trial Chambers need to address when trying to
determine whether the evidence submitted confirms by some material particulars that the
offence charged was committed by the accused. The three factors are as follows: (a) the
Trial Chamber must establish the standard of caution; (b) cautionary standards should be
established by the standards set forth by single-witness evidence; and (c) the Trial
Chamber should look at the totality of circumstantial evidence. Only after these three
factors have been taken into account can a court determine whether the evidence
submitted at trial has any bearing as to whether the accused committed the offence with
which he is charged.
1. The Cautionary Rule, a rule which although outdated, has evolved in recent South
African case law.
Over the years, strict standards of caution have been established. The fear of bias,
self-interest, or an antiquated theory that certain types of people have a propensity to be
unreliable have been replaced with a more reliable standard of corroboration, one based
on common sense rather than on an inflexible rule of law. The cautionary rule was
established in Roman-Dutch jurisdictions in recognition that certain types of persons
were less reliable than others were, particularly when a conviction was attempted based
on uncorroborated evidence of a single witness. 87

87

See Banana v. State. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]

25

First, the cautionary rule specifically addressed the uncorroborated evidence of
sexual complaints, of which the majority of complainants were women.88
In A v Mupfudza, a landmark case, the court developed a two-prong test which revived
the already well-established cautionary rule.89 The first step was for the court to question
whether the complainant was credible, and the second was to determine whether the
evidence had been submitted as corroboration of the evidence which the accused had
already provided.90 The cautionary rule thereby established a high standard of
corroboration by making a prerequisite that there be evidence supporting the witness’s
complaint, despite the fact that the witness was already held to be credible.91 The Courts’
rationale for such a rigid cautionary standard was to promote fair trials and prevent the
conviction of an innocent standing accused.92
88

S v. Jackson, 1998 (1) SACR 470 at 476. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 45.]
89

A v. Mupfudza, 1982 (1) Z.L.R. 271. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 46.]Holmes JA commenting on the cautionary rule involving sexual assault as
requiring “a) the recognition by the court of the inherent danger of the aforesaid: and b)
the existence of some safeguard reducing the risk of wrong conviction, such as
corroboration of the complainant in a respect implicating the accused or the absence of
gainsaying evidence from him, or his mendacity as a witness….” and then later stating
his agreement of Maddonald AJP in R v. J, that such an “exercise of caution should not
be allowed to displace common sense”. S v. Snyman, 1968 (2) 582 (A) at 585C-H &
replicated in 1998 (4) BCLR 424 (SCA). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 14.]
90

See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
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See Banana v State. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
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See also S v. Chyitiyo, 1989 (2) Z.L.R. 144 at 145. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 47.] S v. Chigova 1992 (2) Z.L.R. 206 at 219, 220. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 48.] S v. Manyanga, 1996 (2) 331 at 341. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 49.] S v. Zaranyika, 1997 (1) Z.L.R. 539 at 555.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 50.]
See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (This was an Appeal from the conviction of the Court
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However, in most recent cases, the courts have held that there lacked a rational
basis behind the development of the cautionary rule.93 Moreover, the court in S v D, held
that regardless of whether a case was based on a complaint of rape or one of theft, the test
should be that of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and nothing more.94 Recent
South African law has deemed that the basis of the cautionary rule was irrational,
outdated and based on unjustified stereotypes of complainants (women) in sexual assault
cases.95 In addition, in S v. J, the court cited to a United States case which explicitly
acknowledged the cautionary rules outlived its antiquated rationale by stating that:
What ever might have been its historical significance, the disapproved
instruction now performs no just function, since criminal charges involving sexual
conduct are no more easily made or harder to defend against than many other
of Appeals of Texas, 2nd Circuit, by the Petitioner from a conviction of sexual offenses
based on the amended Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann art 38.07 that did not go into affect until
after the petitioner committed the offense. The court discussed that the rationale for the
requirement of corroboration for sexual assault claims arose when the victim was deemed
to be an accomplice, in which case the law would require credible testimony plus
corroboration. The courts discussion demonstrates the long history of viewing victims of
sexual assaults as untrustworthy). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
51.]
93

See S v. D, 1992 (1) SA 513, at 516 A-C (Namibia). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 16.] See also S v. J, 1988 (4) BCLR 424 (SCA) (citing P v. RinconPineda and other cases which have deemed the cautionary rule to be outdated and
wrongfully discriminatory towards women, by holding that they are more prone to accuse
their attacker of sexual assault for spiteful reasons rather than because it’s the truth.
More importantly, the court acknowledged the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt, especially in sexual assault cases). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 52.] See also P v. Rincon –Pineda, 14Cal 3d 864 (1975). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 53.]
94

See id. S v D. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16.]

95

See S v. Jackson, 1998 (1) SACR 470. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 45.] S v. M, 1999 (2) SACR 548. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
54.]
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classes of charges, and those who make such accusation should be deemed no
more suspect in credibility than any other class of complaints…….A cautionary
instruction bred in circumstances of 17th century criminal rape and criminal
justice need not be disinterred in a contemporary California courtroom in order to
insure that a defendant faced essentially by a single accuser will not be casually
convicted without due process consideration of the relative weight of evidence.96
A significant number of courts have since recognized that the requirement of putting an
additional burden of an outlived rule on victims of sexual assaults could result in unfair
trials for the victims of such cases.97
Although it has been recognized in the ICTR’s jurisprudence as well as in the
precedent of other national courts that charges of rape will not require corroboration,98
the ICTR’s Trial Chamber are still struggling to overcome strict standards of caution that
they are enforcing upon themselves. Specifically, the ICTR must overcome the strict
requirement that it established in Bagalishema, requiring that witness’ testimonies must
coincide in detail. 99 What should be deduced from the evolution of South African law
dealing with cases of sexual assault is that caution should not “displace the exercise of
common sense.”100
96

See S v. J. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 51] See P v. Rincon –
Pineda, at 260. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 52.]
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S v. K 2000, BCLR 405 at 418-419. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
55.]
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; Rules of Evidence, Rule 96 reprinted in 1
MICHAEL P. SCHARF AND VIRGINIA MORRIS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 569 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]
99

See Bagalishema Judgment. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

100

S v. Artman, 1968 (3) SA 339 (A) at 341B. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 11.] S v Chouhan, 1987 (2) SA 315 (ZS) at 316J-318A. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 12.] R v. J, 1966 (1) SA 88 at page 90. [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13.] See S v. Snyman, 1968 (2) SA 582 (A) at
585G. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]
28

2. Single Witness Testimony
The cautionary rules for single witness evidence has always varied according to
the rules of the jurisdiction in which a case is being tried. For example, while in Scotland
there exist the law of unis testis, which literally means, “one witness is no witness,101”
South African law allows a conviction if the court has found that the evidence from the
single witness is credible.102 A single witness is not limited to a case where there exists
only a sole witness, but may also exist when a case has several witnesses, but only one,
which will be testifying on point in issue.103 In this situation, the rest of the witnesses
testifying on surrounding issues should not have any bearing on the key witness’s
credibility.104 By looking at the elements required for the evidence of a single witness to
be credible, a court may adduce what degree of corroboration is required to determine
that the offence charged was committed by the accused.
The standard for the evidence of a single witness was first set in R v Moekoena, in
which it was established that the uncorroborated evidence of a “competent and credible”
witness would suffice for a conviction, but only if the “evidence was clear and
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See Fox v, HM Advocate, 1998 S.L.T. at 339. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 38.]
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See Banana v. State. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5.]
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L.H. Hoffman and D. Zeffert, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE at 575
(Butterworths, 4th ed.). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56.]
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See id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 56.]
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satisfactory in every material way.” 105 Many courts soon applied this high standard as
the general rule for single witness evidence.106 The case itself involved the identification
of the accused by the single witness who said he had identified the defendant by the light
of a pocket torch as he ran past him in the dark.107 In Mokoena such a rigid standard of
proof made sense because of the context in which the identification by the single witness
was made.
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Subsequently, many courts adopted this as the general rule.108 However, recent
cases have criticized Mokoena as an incorrect standard of proof for single witness
evidence.109 In S v Sauls and Others, Diemont JA made the most poignant critique when
he stated that:
There is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to
consideration of the credibility of the single witness (see the remarks of
Rupff JA in S v Webber110). The trial judge will weigh his evidence, will
consider its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether
it is trustworthy and whether despite the fact that there are shortcomings or
defects or contradictions in the testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has
been told. The cautionary rule referred to by De Villiers JP in 1932 [the
first Mokoena case] may be a guide to a right decision but it does not
mean ‘that the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of
the witnesses’ evidence were well founded’ (per Schreiner JA
In R v Nhlapo (AD 10 November 1952) quoted in
R v Bellingham.111) It has been said more than once that the exercise of
caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense.112
In other words, the dictum of Mokoena should be applied as the underlying basis of the
standard set in S v Sauls and others, and not as a principal rule.113
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Furthermore, in Zimbabwe the courts have followed the application of the
cautionary rule as set forth in S v Sauls and Others.114 In S v Nyati, the court
acknowledged that although the evidence of a single witness must be approached with
caution, its credibility should be determined by its merits when compared to any factors
that may detract from its reliability.115 Above all, the mere possibility that the single
witness may have an interest or a bias against the defendant should not alone preclude a
conviction.116 The essential element to this common sense of approach is whether the
court believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the single witness has told the truth,
regardless of any inaccuracies.117
Moreover, while corroboration is not a prerequisite to accepting the evidence of a
single witness, the caution of a court may be satisfied by any factors establishing that the
witness’s story was not concocted and which concurrently add weight to the credibility of
the witness. 118 The basic nature of the single-witness “rule” should not be applied as a
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rule of law, but as a rule of common sense when assessing the credibility of a singlewitness in light of precautionary issues.119

3. Assessing circumstantial evidence submitted at trial.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence which provides inferences of facts of a case
that are in dispute and which may be used in distinguishing the truth.120 The standard of
proof was set in R v Bom, which established that “a) the inference sought to be drawn
must be consistent with all the proved facts;” and “b) that the facts should be such that
they exclude every reasonable inference from them save the one to be drawn.”121
Furthermore, the court should be cautioned from relying too heavily on untruthful
statements that should not have any bearing on the guilt of the accused.122 Rather,
untruthful statements should affect weight of the evidence in light of the circumstances of
each case.123
In addition, the court should apply the rules with the acknowledgment that a
determination of the facts must be made from the totality of the circumstances and not a
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determination from facts that are reviewed in “isolation.”124 Since evidence must
weighed as a whole,125 the court must also take into account the demeanor of the
witnesses, the extent to which there exists or lacks any interest or bias, inconsistencies or
contradictions and the reliability of the testimony itself.126 The variables taken into
account in the assessment of evidence, therefore, create a delicate balance which can only
be established taking every testimony, and evidence of fact into consideration as whole.
David Walker, described this balance between the assessment of the evidence and
determining its weight in his analysis of Scottish law when he said:
It involves deciding which witnesses are honest, which lying, which
exaggerating, which confused, or inaccurate, or forgetful, which truthful, accurate
and reliable, and trying to build up from the whole body of evidence a coherent
picture of what happened. This involves accepting some evidence, discarding
some and trying to piece it all together. There may be gaps in the evidence, things
not observed, period as to which there is silence and so on, and questions may
arise of how fare a judge can draw an inference from incomplete evidence. 127
Accordingly, the trier of fact must take into consideration evidence as a whole in order to
determine the truth of the matter asserted by the witness.128
Inflexible and extremely restrictive standards should not be applied as the
standard rule of thumb in ensuing cases. The ICTR’s Trial Chambers need to look at the
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totality of the circumstantial evidence before coming to a determination of whether the
evidence establishes that the witness is stating the truth. If the witness is held to be
telling the truth or some truths, determining the weight of the truthful statements should
help the Trial Chambers in their decision as to whether to convict. Mere inaccuracies
however, should not be an excuse to so easily dismiss evidence, which may have the least
probative value.
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